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ABSTRACT
The pervasive scarcity of resources relative to the demands upon them makes it
necessary for decision makers to think carefully about choices. Evidence from
economics can help to inform such choices, particularly as it relates to costs, out-
comes, the efficiency with which resources are used, the distribution of benefits
and burdens across different individuals and budgets, and the processes by which
care and treatment are delivered. However, there is still insufficient economic
evidence to inform the full range of decisions to be taken in the dementia
field; indeed the accumulated volume of evidence remains very modest. The
measurement of cost is often too narrow, and there is some disagreement about
whether and how to include the costs (direct or indirect) incurred by caregivers.
The conceptualization of outcomes for certain purposes has generated
argument, especially when attempts are made to introduce generic measures
that apply across many clinical areas. It has not always been demonstrated that
such measures have any validity in the dementia field. Other comparatively
neglected areas have been research on equity and the processes by which care
is delivered. Finally, the paper looks at economic barriers to implementation of
evidence-based interventions, and the policy levers that might prove influential.
Introduction
It is now widely recognized that, for better or for worse, economics is always
lurking in the background of policy and practice discussions in health and related
care systems. Although the health professional delivering one-to-one therapy,
prescribing a medication or arranging a group activity might not have to be
concerned about the immediate costs of their decisions (although increasingly
many will be aware of them), further along the management chain someone will
be keeping a very watchful eye on expenditure. And while this latter budget
holder will be focused on balancing the books at the end of the financial year,
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someone even further along the chain in the health system will need to consider
wider strategic options and will be intent on achieving “value for money” (in
some sense) in the use of resources. For example, when a new treatment becomes
available and is found to be effective in, say, symptom alleviation or improving
personal functioning, someone will have to decide whether it is affordable and
whether it generates health improvements that are worth what it costs to purchase
or use the treatment.
Occasionally, economic issues will move to the foreground. An example would
be the recent debate in England and Wales over the decision by the National
Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) not to recommend use of the
Alzheimer’s medications on the grounds of cost-effectiveness. I will come back to
that debate about NICE later. Economic considerations also get an airing when
there is discussion about some of the wider impacts of health problems, such as
the crime costs associated with substance addiction or the welfare payment costs
associated with unemployment arising from long-term depression. These too will
be discussed later in this paper, as they help us to understand how politicians and
other decision-makers do (or do not) take notice of different types of evidence.
The underlying challenge is scarcity: there are not enough resources to meet
all of a society’s needs. This is a blindingly obvious statement of reality that
many people (including some clinicians, families, advocacy bodies and others)
surprisingly still manage to forget. It is also the most fundamental, pervasive,
durable and relevant justification for a better understanding of the economics
of treating dementia. Because scarcity is a permanent feature of all health and
related systems, difficult choices have to be made between alternative uses of any
particular resource or service. Those choices give meaning to costs, as described
in the next section. But economists are not “glorified accountants” and are
concerned with much more than just costs. In particular, economic evaluation
aims to provide evidence that can inform both clinical practice and strategic
decisions about how to allocate available resources so as to get more out of them
in terms of better outcomes (for example, in relation to symptom alleviation,
improved personal functioning, relief of caregiver burden).
There are perhaps five dimensions to be considered when discussing the
economic aspects of health care interventions and policies in general and in
relation to dementia care: costs, outcomes, efficiency, equity, and process. Each
is considered in turn in the sections below, followed by discussion of the levers
that might be pulled in order to bring about change.
Costs
The dimension most commonly associated with economics is cost. What, for
example, are the costs of dementia if unrecognized or under-treated? What are
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the costs of delivering treatment and providing supportive care? Where do these
costs fall? Are they actual expenditures or notional costs?
There are a number ways to categorize the costs associated with dementia.
There are direct costs associated with the pharmacological and psychological
treatments and associated support services, some of them delivered by non-
health agencies. There are also indirect costs, which may fall to families as
out-of-pocket expenses or lost income because of disruptions to employment.
There may also be some unmeasured costs, associated with lost leisure time or
psychological burden for family members.
Opportunity costs
In economic evaluations, the usual and theoretically correct approach is to try to
measure these elements as long-run marginal opportunity costs (Knapp, 1993).
This helps to ensure that a long-term perspective on resource implications is
employed, that only those effects on resources attributable to the program or
service user are counted, and that costs are reckoned as opportunities forgone,
not just money expended (although the two will sometimes be the same). How
broadly the costs are measured will depend upon the perspective taken for the
evaluation, which in turn depends upon the purpose of the study – points to
which I return in a moment.
Measuring costs
In carrying out evaluations in practice, the economist would be looking for
data on service use patterns from one or more source. The data might come
from a “billing” system, recording the amounts that are transferred between a
payer and a provider for services used by individual people. This is a generally
feasible approach in U.S. research, for example, where billing or similar data are
commonly available. In care systems without such payment mechanisms there
might nevertheless be routine information systems that record service contacts
and referrals which provide the necessary data. However, in most countries
there are no such billing data and information systems are too rudimentary
or unreliable to provide a basis for cost calculation. In these circumstances,
the usual approach is to collect information on patterns of service use through
interviews with family members or service professionals. There are a number of
research tools for this purpose. One that my colleagues and I have developed and
which has been used in hundreds of studies across the mental health and other
fields is the Client Service Receipt Inventory (Beecham and Knapp, 2000). A
specific and also widely used tool is the Resource Utilization in Dementia tool
(Wimo et al., 2000).
To the service use levels generated by information systems or from these
research tools, the researcher then needs to attach unit cost estimates. It is
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not always necessary to calculate these unit costs anew. In England, we are
fortunate in having the annual Personal Social Services Research Unit (PSSRU)
compendium of unit costs for health and social care, and this is now widely
employed (Curtis and Netten, 2006). A similar compendium is currently under
development in Spain, and I am aware of off-the-shelf collections of unit costs
(for some services at least) for Finland, Italy and the Netherlands.
This approach to cost calculation (using a questionnaire to collect
retrospective or prospective service use data, and then attaching unit costs
mostly drawn from the published annual compendium) is now quite commonly
employed. It was the approach employed in, for example, the AD2000 (AD 2000
Collaborative Group, 2004) study of donepezil, in a recent cost-effectiveness
evaluation of cognitive stimulation therapy (Knapp et al., 2006), and in a study
of memantine costs (Wimo et al., 2003).
Breadth of costs
People with dementia are likely to use a number of services, each of which needs
to be captured for a fully comprehensive economic evaluation. In addition, there
will be many and important inputs from family and other (unpaid) caregivers.
How those latter inputs are costed is a source of contention. Many studies have
shown the costs of informal care to be considerably greater than the costs of
services provided to people with dementia (e.g. see Lowin et al., 2001; Jo¨nsson
et al., 2002), but the costing of caregiver inputs is not straightforward.
One reason is that it is difficult to measure the input: how many hours of
informal care are actually delivered, and how easy is it to distinguish informal
care from the normal patterns of interaction of a marriage or family life?
Second, it is difficult to put a value on those hours. One approach is to use a
replacement cost method, assuming that informal caregivers would be replaced
by paid staff. However, this is not very realistic, particularly if applied to every
caregiver hour within a society, because such a major change to the employment
pattern for care workers would undoubtedly alter the market wage rate. On the
other hand, the “opportunity cost” method which assigns a value equivalent
to what is given up by the caregiver, is likely to under-estimate the true cost
because many caregivers of older people with dementia are not forgoing paid
employment, and may put a relatively low marginal value on lost leisure time
(Brouwer et al., 2001). Third, there is the more general difficulty of the perspective
employedwithin an evaluation. Bodies such asNICE are required to take a health
and social care system perspective, which means that they necessarily attach a
zero value to caregiver inputs (and see below). But the inclusion of such costs can
change the overall pattern of differences, as demonstrated in a related context
by Schneider et al. (2003).
Economic outcomes and levers 487
Outcomes
Economists are interested in the effectiveness of interventions as a key
component of the evaluation of the performance of health systems. The most
well-known form of such evaluation is cost-effectiveness analysis. The term is used
as both a generic term for economic evaluation as well as being a particular type
of evaluation, the types being distinguishable by the way that they conceptualize
and measure outcomes.
Outcomes and cost-effectiveness analysis
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) as a type of evaluation measures costs as set
out above, and measures outcomes using instruments and scales familiar from
clinical studies. A CEA can help decision-makers choose between alternative
interventions aimed at a specific disorder. A CEAwould look at a single outcome
dimension – such as change in cognition or behavior, or symptom-free days – and
then compute the ratio of the difference in costs between two interventions to the
difference in outcome (the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio or ICER). A second
ICER could be calculated for a second outcome. For example, our evaluation of
cognitive stimulation therapy (CST)measured costs quite broadly and compared
changes in costs between CST and treatment as usual with changes in cognition
as the primary outcome, and changes in quality of life as the secondary outcome
(Knapp et al., 2006)
More broadly, the choice of effectiveness measure(s) depends on the question
to be addressed. If the question is essentially clinical – what is the most
appropriate treatment for a dementia patient in a particular circumstance, and
which therapeutic package to opt for – then information is needed on the
comparative costs of the different therapies and the comparative outcomes
measured in terms of (dementia-specific) symptom alleviation, improved
functioning or quality of life enhancement. In these circumstances, a CEA of the
kind just set out would be appropriate.
Utility
However, if a broader question needs to be addressed, such as whether to invest
health care resources in treatment of either dementia or stroke or breast cancer,
then decision-makers need an effectiveness measure that uses a common metric
across these clinical fields. The most commonly employed such measure is
“utility,” generated from health-related quality of life scales. Combining such
a measure with information on costs allows the economist to carry out what
is often called a cost-utility analysis. The best-known and most robust measure
of “utility” is the Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY). Cost-utility analyses can
inform health care resource allocation decisions or priority setting, of the kind
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carried out by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE), which has
responsibility for providing guidance in England and Wales on how to promote
health and treat ill-health.
Cost-utility analyses have strengths, including using a generic unidimensional
measure that allows comparisons across diagnostic or clinical groups, and
a methodology for weighting preferences and valuing health states. The
QALY is also a measure with attractive “cardinal” properties, unlike most
clinical measures in the dementia field. But these same features may also
generate weaknesses: the utility measure may be seen as too reductionist; the
generic quality of life indicator may be insufficiently sensitive to the kinds of
change expected in dementia treatment; and a transparent approach to scale
construction paradoxically opens the approach to criticism from those who
question the values thereby obtained. In particular, there are worries that the
generic utility-generating instruments, such as the EQ-5D (EuroQol Group,
1990) and the SF-6D (Brazier et al., 2002) which are the only two currently
recommended for use by NICE, are insufficiently sensitive to pick up symptom
and functioning changes expected in dementia patients.
There is thus a quandary for researchers and decision-makers in England and
Wales today, and in some other countries that have chosen a strategic evidence-
based approach to resource allocation in the health system. On the one hand, a
generic outcomemeasure such as theQALY,when combinedwith cost estimates,
can point to ways of improving efficiency. On the other hand, if that QALY
measure is not reflecting the underlying effectiveness changes in the clinical area
to which it is applied, then it must surely be of limited use. This is proving quite
an issue, because the QALY measures advocated and employed by NICE have
no proven validity in the dementia field.
Benefits
To address a still broader question, about whether to invest more money in the
health system or in improving transport or launching a new environmental policy,
then another measure of outcome is needed. In this case, where “outcome”
needs to be measured in a common unit relevant across all of these areas of
public policy, the usual choice is a monetary measure. Cost-benefit analysis asks
whether the monetary benefits of a treatment or policy exceed the costs. All
costs and outcomes (benefits) are valued in the same units – money. If benefits
exceed costs, the evaluation would recommend providing the treatment, and
vice versa. With two or more alternatives (comparing, say, health care with
education), the intervention with the greatest net benefit would be deemed
the most efficient. Cost-benefit analyses are thus intrinsically attractive, but
conducting them is especially problematic because of the difficulties associated
with valuing outcomes in monetary terms.
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Comparing costs incurred (for example on treatments) with costs saved (for
example on future health services no longer needed) is not a cost-benefit analysis
but a cost-offset comparison. This confusion is unfortunately still quite common.
A cost-benefit analysis must measure outcomes (in terms of improved health or
improved quality of life) and then convert them to monetary values.
The problem is that attaching values to the outcomes of treatments
for dementia is inherently complicated. In due course, methodological
developments in health economics may offer a way to obtain direct valuations
of health outcomes by patients, relatives or the general public. There are
techniques that ask individuals to state the amount they would be prepared to
pay (hypothetically) to achieve a given health state or health gain, or they involve
the observation of actual behavior and impute values (Olsen and Smith, 2001).
Such methods are likely to be difficult to apply in mental health contexts, and
especially for people with moderate to severe cognitive impairment. The same
applies to another approach that is used to value health interventions. Conjoint
analysis asks individuals to rank different real world scenarios, which may consist
of several dimensions (including, for instance, health outcomes, quality of life,
time inputs, discomfort and stigma) and includes cost as one of these dimensions
so that a monetary value can be elicited.
There are no published cost-benefit analyses of dementia interventions.
Question and perspective
The choice of question therefore clearly influences the type of evaluation needed
and the type of effectiveness measure needed, and therein lie many of the
controversies that have surfaced in this field recently. But it is important to
note that the choices of evaluation variant are not mutually exclusive: a single
study could support more than one type of analysis. Thus a study designed
to conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis could – with the right supplementary
collection of information – also generate cost-utility findings. However, and
slightly in contradiction, evidence which is well located within the clinical domain
and which is exactly what the treating professional needs may not always be
appropriate for a higher level decision-making body, such as the health ministry.
Generally speaking, the broader the research question, the more demanding are
the data needs: cost-benefit analyses are harder to do (well) than cost-utility
analyses, which in turn are tougher than cost-effectiveness analyses.
Linked to the specification of the question to be addressed is the perspective to
be adopted. Is the evaluative information needed to help resource allocation
within a particular agency (such as a psychogeriatric service), or within a
particular system (such as the health care system) or within the wider economy
or society? The breadth of perspective will determine the breadth of both the
measurement of costs and the effectiveness or outcomes.
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Efﬁciency
Knowing the wide-ranging costs of dementia helps decision-makers to gauge the
overall societal impact of this set of illnesses. Knowing whether a treatment might
“pay for itself” by reducing expenditures in later periods or on other services
helps decision-makers focus their minds on the need for better preventive or
treatment interventions. But neither of these can tell a decision-maker how to
make better or best use of available resources. For this purpose it is necessary
to examine both the costs and the outcomes of different uses of those resources.
As discussed above, this is what economists would recognize as the examination
of cost-effectiveness, which is addressing the efficiency question.
Is it worth it?
Consider what happens following the development or introduction of (say) a new
medication. Decision-makers face two key questions when considering whether
to use or recommend this new drug as part of the treatment range. The first is the
clinical question: is the medication effective in alleviating dementia symptoms,
slowing cognitive decline or generally improving patient functioning? Or, when
considering two or more different drugs, which has the better outcomes along
these dimensions? If the answer to the clinical question is that the newmedication
is no better or perhaps actually worse than existing treatment options, then there
is usually no need to consider its use any further. But if the newmedication looks
clinically effective, the decision-maker will want an answer to a second question:
is it cost-effective? That is, does the treatment achieve the improved outcomes
at a cost that is worth paying?
These two questions (Is the treatment effective? Is it worth it?) sit at the heart of
economic evaluation. It is important to emphasize that cost-effectiveness analysis
aims to do just what it says: it looks at both costs and effectiveness (outcomes).
Comparing the costs of one intervention with the costs of another, without any
evidence on outcomes, might be interesting but does not constitute an economic
evaluation because it does not provide enough information to assist service
professionals, managers or others to make choices between alternative uses of
their scarce resources. Similarly, calculating the costs and outcomes of a single in-
tervention could be revealing, but again is not especially helpful (and not strictly
an economic evaluation) unless comparison is made with equivalent data for
another intervention, for otherwise the decision-maker will have no benchmark
against which to judge whether the observed costs and outcomes are attractive.
Trade-offs
Deciding what is or is not “worth” the cost is far from straightforward and not
without controversy, as amply demonstrated by recent discussion of the decision
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by NICE not to recommend the Alzheimer’s drugs for use in the health service
in England and Wales.
Many evaluations of new interventions find them to be both more effective
(the outcome profiles are better than for old or current interventions) but
simultaneously more expensive. For example, our cognitive stimulation therapy
study mentioned earlier found that CST had better outcomes but also slightly
higher costs than treatment as usual. How is the trade-off to be made between
the better outcomes and the higher expenditure necessary to achieve them?
The methodological approach now widely used is to construct cost-effectiveness
acceptability curves (CEACs). These show the probability that a new intervention
will be cost-effective for each of a number of pre-specified or implicit valuations of
an outcome improvement by the decision-maker. The CEAC is a comparatively
recent development, and there are as yet few published applications of it in the
dementia field, but its use will grow. One advantage of the approach is that it
makes transparent the trade-offs faced by decision-makers.
Equity
Equity refers to fairness, whether in relation to paying for treatment, or in getting
access to care, or in the distribution of resources across a country, or in the health-
related quality of life of different groups within a population. Recent examples of
equity discussions in the U.K. have focused on postcode prescribing (access to
new medications depending on the area in which someone lives), income-related
inequalities in prevalence of mental illness and in treatment access, and the long-
rumbling arguments about whether people with dementia should be asked to pay
for their long-term care (because social care in the U.K. is means-tested while
health care is not).
There is not space here to go into detail on the equity question, but it
is important to emphasize the need for evaluators and policy-makers alike to
consider not just the efficiency with which needs are addressed and treatments
delivered, but also the distribution of resource burdens and of health and quality of
life outcomes across the population. Do different people within the population
have different opportunities to access particular treatments? Do they have to
carry different burdens of payment? Is there an imbalance between quality of life
outcomes enjoyed by patients and family caregivers?
Process
Many people would argue that it is not just a question of what is achieved in
a health system but how it is achieved. Changing the process of delivery and
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treatment could be beneficial and cost-effective in its own right. A good example
would be the growing emphasis on consumer-directed services (or perhaps
caregiver-directed services if proxy decision-makers are considered) (Knapp,
2007).
Consumer-directed services are being developed in the Netherlands, in
Germany with the long-term care insurance arrangements introduced in 1996,
in various parts of the U.S.A., and in the U.K. Individuals are given the cash
to choose their own services and providers, with different consumer-directed
arrangements having different constraints on the use of such devolved funds.
There is some controversy, with advocates arguing for the increased choice and
control that comes with such arrangements, while critics point to the risks for
vulnerable individuals, including those with cognitive impairment, from abuse
and neglect, and also the risk that payments may simply be used to supplement
family income rather than support care for individuals.
In the U.K. there has been some investment in the system of direct
payments, which transfers social care funding to service users, who then have the
opportunity to spend their budgets on a range of services to meet their personal
(care) needs. Direct payments were made available to older people in England
andWales in 2000.More recently, there has been experimentationwith individual
budgets. These pull in a wide range of funding streams and give the individuals
holding them considerable freedom as to how to use them. Dissatisfaction with
direct payments, particularly the restrictions imposed on how funding can be
used, was one reason for the experimental introduction of individual budgets
(Glendinning et al., 2006). However, people with dementia are less likely than
other older people to get these opportunities to control their budgets (Fernandez
et al., 2007). The evidence base on whether such approaches are efficient and
equitable remains embryonic. But, as advocates of consumer-directed services
would assert, there are intrinsic benefits from the very process of exercising choice
and having control of one’s life.
Levers
What, then, stops a health system achieving better economic outcomes, whether
in terms of reduced costs, improved outcomes, greater efficiency, more accep-
table distributional patterns or a more engaging or empowering care process?
A number of barriers get in the way. One of those barriers is undoubtedly
the evidence base. Clinicians lament the weak evidence base in relation to many
of the treatment options available or being introduced for treating people with
dementia (see other papers in this journal issue). The corresponding economic
evidence is far weaker (see the paper by Wimo in this issue).
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But even when there is an adequate evidence base there are other barriers.
One of the most insidious and seemingly insurmountable barriers is resource in-
sufficiency: old age mental health services are under-funded, so that it is
impossible to employ enough skilled staff or to purchase appropriate medica-
tions. Even when resources are available they might be poorly distributed,
available at the wrong place or time relative to the distribution of needs. They
may be available only if delivered by specialist clinics. A more general difficulty
is that available services do not match what is needed or preferred by service
users or their families. An example of such inflexibility is the deep-rooted
reluctance to move away from institution-based services in some countries. A
linked challenge is resource dislocation: services may potentially be available to
meet individual and family needs, but they are poorly coordinated, a situation
compounded perhaps by professional rivalry, stultifying bureaucracy or “silo
budgeting” (resources held in one agency’s “silo” cannot be allocated to other
uses). There might also be a problem of ageism within health systems, plus of
course the perennial problem of political will.
Each of these barriers could be discussed, but here I want to focus on the last
of them – political will – because sometimes it takes more than just an evidence
base to win the support of decision-makers for a particular course of action.
It is instructive to compare dementia treatment with other areas in the mental
health spectrum, and to look at the levers that can and often are pulled to bring
about change. For example, in relation to conduct disorder, which is the most
prevalent mental health problem among children, public (and therefore political)
fear of antisocial behavior and the strong threads of continuity between conduct
disorder in childhood, delinquency in adolescence and criminality in adulthood
are encouraging decision makers to prioritize the treatment of conduct disorder.
Similarly the high societal costs of crime committed by people with heroin and
other substance misuse problems have helped to focus decision-makers’ minds.
Depression is associated with interrupted patterns of work, absenteeism, and
low productivity, in turn leading to heavy reliance on social security payments.
Recently, the British government has been particularly concerned to try to
improve the employment profiles of people with depression and anxiety in order
to reduce reliance on welfare payments. The largest cost element in dementia is
caregiver burden, but this does not appear to loom especially large in the minds
of the public or decision-makers. Were it to do so, it might prove to be a useful
lever for change.
Conclusion
The starting point for an interest in the economics of dementia treatment is
clearly scarcity: it is the recognition that there are not, and there never will be,
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enough resources available to meet all of the needs of people with dementia or
their families. There is still a notion abroad in some parts of some health systems
that incremental growth in budgets will gradually remove all need, but this is
wildly over-optimistic. Health and social care decision-makers cannot and must
not avoid facing up to the choices that have to bemade in the face of such scarcity.
In making those choices decision-makers should aim to be transparent about the
criteria they are employing. Are they looking to maximize effectiveness in terms
of symptom alleviation or aggregate quality of life, or to redistribute resources to
poorer communities within society, or to ensure that access to skilled resources
is equally available to every patient?
Within this set of criteria, cost-effectiveness obviously has a role to play.
As noted earlier, the cost-effectiveness criterion should probably be seen as
secondary. If, for example, a therapeutic intervention has been shown to be
effective in improving the health or well-being of people with dementia, and
appears to be more effective than currently available treatments, then it ought to
be natural to ask about the relative costs of the two options and to compare those
costs with the outcome gains. Balancing outcome improvements with higher
costs is, however, quite a challenge. A great many economic evaluations across
the health spectrum today find that new therapies (whether pharmacological,
psychological or organizational) offer better outcome profiles than currently
prevalent interventions, but they do so at higher cost. The decision-maker,
whether this is a local budget holder or someone near the top of a national
health system, then faces a difficult trade-off: are the better outcomes from the
new intervention worth the higher cost of introducing that intervention?
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